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Broadcast Channels with Confidential Messages by
Randomness Constrained Stochastic Encoder
Shun Watanabe Member, IEEE and Yasutada Oohama Member, IEEE
Abstract—In coding schemes for the wire-tap channel or the
broadcast channels with confidential messages, it is well known
that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoding to avoid the
information about the transmitted confidential message to be
leaked to an eavesdropper. In this paper, it is investigated that
the trade-off between the rate of the random number to realize
the stochastic encoding and the rates of the common, private, and
confidential messages. For the direct theorem, the superposition
coding scheme for the wire-tap channel recently proposed by Chia
and El Gamal is employed, and its strong security is proved. The
matching converse theorem is also established. Our result clarifies
that a combination of the ordinary stochastic encoding and the
channel prefixing by the channel simulation is suboptimal.
Index Terms—Broadcast Channel, Confidential Messages, Ran-
domness Constraint, Stochastic Encoder, Superposition Coding,
Wire-tap Channel
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel is one sender and two receivers
broadcast channel model in which the sender, usually referred
to as Alice, wants to transmit a confidential message to the
legitimate receiver, usually referred to as Bob, in such a way
that the other receiver, usually referred to as eavesdropper Eve,
cannot get any information about the transmitted message. The
wire-tap channel model was first introduced by Wyner in his
seminal paper [1]. Later, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner investigated the
model called broadcast channels with confidential messages
(BCC) in which Alice also sends a common message that
is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. These
models were further investigated by many researchers from
theoretical point of view (e.g.. see [2]), and recently it has
attracted considerable attention from practical point of view
as a physical layer security.
In coding schemes for the wire-tap channel or the BCC, it is
well known that the sender needs to use a stochastic encoder
to avoid the information about the transmitted confidential
message to be leaked to Eve. The stochastic encoding is
usually realized by preparing a dummy random number in
addition to the intended messages and by encoding them
to a transmitted signal by a deterministic encoder. Further-
more, when the channel to Bob is not more capable than
the channel to Eve, it is known that the sender needs to
use the channel prefixing to achieve the capacity region (or
the secrecy capacity) because the capacity formulas involve
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such a channel from an auxiliary random variable to the
random variable describing the input signal of the channel
[3]. In literatures, it is assumed that there exists a channel
realizing the channel prefixing. But in practice the prefixing
channel must be simulated from a random number by using
a method such as the channel simulation [4], which usually
involves certain amount of simulation error depending on the
amount of the random number. So far, there was no paper
investigating how much random number is needed to achieve
the capacity region. Since the random number is precious
resource in practice, though it has been paid no attention in
literatures, it is extremely important to investigate the amount
of random number needed to achieve the capacity region.
For this purpose, we formulate the problem of the BCC by
randomness constrained stochastic encoder, and completely
characterize the capacity region of this new problem.
The present problem to consider the randomness constrained
stochastic encoder is motivated by the authors’ previous results
in [5]. In that paper, the capacity region of the relay channel
with confidential messages for the completely deterministic
encoder was investigated, and the capacity region was char-
acterized for the BCC as a corollary. In this paper, we are
interested in the case such that the randomness is constrained
but not zero. The result in [5] can be regarded as an extreme
case of the present problem. On the other hand, the conven-
tional BCC problem can be regarded as the other extreme case,
in which the amount of randomness that can be used at the
encoder is unbounded.
Typically in the BCC, Alice sends the common message
that is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve, and
the confidential message that is supposed to be decoded only
by Bob. The level of secrecy of the confidential message
is usually evaluated by the equivocation rate. In this paper,
we consider slightly different problem formulation, which has
been appeared in the literature [6], [5]. In our problem setting,
Alice sends three kinds of messages, the common message, the
private message, and the confidential messages. The common
message is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve. The
private message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and we do
not care whether Eve can decode the private message or not.
The confidential message is supposed to be decoded by Bob,
and it must be kept completely secret from Eve. Furthermore,
for stochastic encoding, Alice is allowed to use limited amount
of dummy randomness. Thus, we are interested in the trade-off
between quadruple of rates, the rate of dummy randomness,
the rates of common, private, and confidential messages. The
coding system of our formulation is depicted in Fig. 1.
The reason we do not use the equivocation rate formulation
is as follows. In the conventional equivocation rate formula-
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Fig. 1. The coding system investigated in this paper. Alice sends common
message Kn, private message Ln, and confidential message Sn by using a
deterministic function fn and a limited amount of dummy randomness An.
The common message is supposed to be decoded by both Bob and Eve.
The private message is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and we do not care
whether Eve can decode the private message or not. The confidential message
is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and it must be kept completely secret from
Eve.
tion, if the rate of dummy randomness is not sufficient, a part
of the confidential message is sacrificed to make the other part
completely secret and the rate of the completely secret part
corresponds to the equivocation rate. We think that the rates
of sacrificed part and completely secret part become clearer
by employing our formulation.
As we have mentioned above, the typical coding scheme
for the wire-tap channel or the BCC consists of the stochastic
encoding and the channel prefixing. In [7], Chia and El
Gamal proposed an alternative coding scheme that utilizes
the so-called superposition coding [8] instead of the channel
prefixing. In the direct part of our main result, we employ
this superposition scheme instead of the channel prefixing.
We also clarifies that a straightforward combination of the
ordinary stochastic coding and the channel prefixing by the
channel simulation method is suboptimal.
Although Chia and El Gamal showed that the superposition
coding scheme can realize the so-called weak security criterion
[9], [10], it was not clear whether the superposition coding
scheme can realize the so-called strong security criterion. One
of technical contributions of this paper is to show that Chia
and El Gamal’s superposition coding scheme can realize the
strong security criterion. This is done by using the technique
proposed in [11], and by considering the channel resolvability
problem [12] with the superposition coding. Note that the
relationship between the wire-tap channel coding and the
channel resolvability was first pointed out by Csisza´r [10],
and is well recognized recently [13], [14], [15], [16]. The
channel resolvability with the superposition coding was first
investigated by the second author in [17]. In that paper, the
channel resolvability problem with the superposition coding
for the degraded broadcast channel was considered to show the
converse theorem of the identification via degraded broadcast
channels. In this paper, the channel resolvability problem with
the superposition coding for a single channel is considered.
Using the superposition coding for a single channel seems
nonsense at first glance, it does have a meaning when applied
to the wire-tap channel or the BCC.
After the submission of the first manuscript of this paper,
we noticed some related works investigating the importance
of random number in the BCC or the wire-tap channel. In
[18], Hayashi and Matsumoto considered the secure multiplex
coding [19] in which the messages are not necessarily uniform
nor independent and the entropy rate of the messages might
be constrained. Although the secure multiplex coding can be
regarded as a generalization of the BCC, the encoder can
use unlimited amount of dummy randomness in addition to
the messages in their problem formulation. Thus, our results
cannot be derived from their results. In [20], Bloch and
Kliewer considered the wire-tap channel in which the dummy
randomness is constrained and not necessarily uniform. How-
ever, they only considered the case such that the channel to
Bob is more capable than that to Eve. In such a case, the
channel prefixing is not needed, and their result corresponds
to Corollary 12 in this paper when the dummy randomness is
uniform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the problem formulation is explained and main results are
presented. In Section III, the channel resolvability problem
with the superposition coding is discussed. In Section IV, the
proof of the main theorem is presented. In Section V, the paper
is concluded with discussions. Some technical arguments are
presented in Appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND MAIN RESULTS
A. Problem Formulation
Let PY |X and PZ|X be two channels with common input al-
phabet X and output alphabets Y and Z respectively. Through-
out the paper, the alphabets are assumed to be finite though we
do not use finiteness of the alphabet except cardinality bonds
on auxiliary random variables. We also assume that the base
of logarithm is e throughout the paper.
Let Kn be the set of the common message, Ln be the set
of the private message, and Sn be the set of the confidential
message. The common message is supposed to be decoded
by both Bob and Eve. The private message is supposed to
be decoded by Bob, and we do not care whether Eve can
decode the private message or not. The confidential message
is supposed to be decoded by Bob, and it must be kept
completely secret from Eve.
Typically, Alice use a stochastic encoder to make the confi-
dential message secret from Eve, and it is practically realized
by using a uniform dummy randomness on the alphabet An.
When the size |An| of dummy randomness is infinite, any
stochastic encoder from Kn×Ln×Sn to Xn can be simulated
by a deterministic encoder fn : Kn × Ln × Sn ×An → Xn.
But we are interested in the case with bounded size |An| in
this paper.
Bob’s decoder is defined by function gn : Yn → Kn×Ln×
Sn and the error probability is defined as
Perr(fn, gn)
=
∑
kn∈Kn
∑
ℓn∈Ln
∑
sn∈Sn
∑
an∈An
1
|Kn||Ln||Sn||An|
PnY |X(y
n|fn(kn, ℓn, sn, an))1[gn(y
n) 6= (kn, ℓn, sn)],
(1)
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where 1[·] is the indicator function. Eve’s decoder is defined by
function φn : Zn → Kn and the error probability Perr(fn, φn)
is defined in a similar manner as Eq. (1).
Let
PZ˜n|Sn(z
n|sn) =
∑
kn∈Kn
∑
ℓn∈Ln
∑
an∈An
1
|Kn||Ln||An|
PnZ|X(z
n|fn(kn, ℓn, sn, an)),
PZ˜n(z
n) =
∑
sn∈Sn
1
|Sn|
PZ˜n|Sn(z
n|sn)
be the output distributions of the channel Pn
Z|X . In this paper,
we consider the security criterion given by
D(fn) := D(PSnZ˜n‖PSn × PZ˜n)
=
∑
sn∈Sn
1
|Sn|
D(PZ˜n|Sn(·|sn)‖PZ˜n)
= I(Sn; Z˜
n),
where D(·‖·) is the divergence, and I(·; ·) is the mutual
information [8]. The coding system investigated in this paper
is depicted in Fig. 1.
In this paper, we are interested in the trade-off among the
rate the dummy randomness, and the rates of the common,
private, and confidential messages.
Definition 1: The rate quadruple (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) is said to
be achievable if there exists a sequence of Alice’s deterministic
encoder fn : Kn × Ln × Sn × An → Xn, Bob’s decoder
gn : Y
n → Kn×Ln×Sn, and Eve’s decoder φn : Zn → Kn
such that
lim
n→∞
Perr(fn, gn) = 0, (2)
lim
n→∞
Perr(fn, φn) = 0, (3)
lim
n→∞
D(fn) = 0, (4)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |An| ≤ Rd, (5)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn| ≥ R0, (6)
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Ln| = R1, (7)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Sn| ≥ Rs. (8)
Then the achievable region R is defined as the set of all
achievable rate quadruples.
B. Statements of General Results
The following is our main result in this paper.
Theorem 2: Let R∗ be a closed convex set consisting
of those quadruples (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) for which there exist
auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔
(Y, Z) and
R0 ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)], (9)
R0 +R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
(10)
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (11)
R1 +Rd ≥ I(X ;Z|U), (12)
Rd ≥ I(X ;Z|V ). (13)
Then we have R = R∗. Moreover, it may be assumed that
V = (U, V ′) and that the ranges of U and V ′ may be assumed
to satisfy |U| ≤ |X |+ 3 and |V ′| ≤ |X |+ 1.
Proof: See Section IV.
The conditions on R0 and R1+Rs in Eqs. (9) and (10) re-
semble the conditions in the broadcast channel with degraded
message sets [21]. The condition on Rs in Eq. (11) exists
because there is a security requirement on the confidential
message. These conditions are exactly the same as those in
the conventional BCC (see Corollary 6). The conditions on R1
and Rd in Eqs. (12) and (13) additionally appear in Theorem
2 because there are randomness constraints in our problem
setting.
Remark 3: Conventionally, the security requirement defined
by
lim
n→∞
1
n
D(fn) = 0 (14)
is usually employed instead of Eq. (4). Eq. (14) is called weak
security criterion and Eq. (4) is called strong security criterion
[10], [9]. Let R˜ be the achievable region in which Eq. (4) is
replaced by Eq. (14). From the definitions of two regions,
R ⊂ R˜ obviously holds. Actually, we are implicitly showing
R˜ ⊂ R∗ in the converse proof of Theorem 2. Thus, R = R˜.
Remark 4: As we will find in the achievability proof of the
main theorem, the private message can be used as dummy
randomness to protect the confidential message from Eve.
Thus, if we define the achievable rate region Rˆ by replacing
Eq. (7) with
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |Ln| ≥ R1, (15)
region Rˆ is broader than region R. Indeed, Rˆ is a closed
convex set consisting of those quadruples (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) for
which there exist auxiliary random variables (U, V ) satisfying
the same conditions as Theorem 2 except Eq. (12)1.
Remark 5: Eq. (13) means that there is a certain amount of
dummy randomness that cannot be substituted by the private
message. Note that the difference between the private message
and the dummy randomness is whether Bob needs to decode
it or not.
Let
R∞ = {(R0, R1, Rs) : ∃Rd ≥ 0 s.t. (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) ∈ R}
1It can be proved by just omitting the derivation of Eq. (12) in the converse
proof of Theorem 2.
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be the set of all achievable triplet (R0, R1, Rs) by arbitrary
stochastic encoder. By taking sufficiently large Rd, we recover
the following well known result [3]2.
Corollary 6: ([3]) Region R∞ is a closed convex set con-
sisting of those triplet (R0, R1, Rs) for which there exist
auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔
(Y, Z) and
R0 ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
R0 +R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).
Let
Rdet = {(R0, R1, Rs) : (0, R0, R1, Rs) ∈ R}
be the set of all rate triplets that can be achieved by determin-
istic encoder. This extreme case was solved in [5], which can
be also derived as a corollary of Theorem 23.
Corollary 7: ([5]) Let R∗det be a closed convex set con-
sisting of those triplet (R0, R1, Rs) for which there exists an
auxiliary random variable U such that U ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
R0 ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
R0 +R1 +Rs ≤ I(X ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
Rs ≤ I(X ;Y |U)− I(X ;Z|U),
R1 ≥ I(X ;Z|U).
Then we have Rdet = R∗det.
Proof: The inclusion R∗det ⊂ Rdet is obvious by taking
V = X in Theorem 2. For the opposite inclusion, note that
Eq. (13) and Rd = 0 imply
I(X ;Z|U) = I(V ;Z|U) + I(X ;Z|V ) = I(V ;Z|U).
We also have I(V ;Y |U) ≤ I(X ;Y |U) from the Markov
condition of the auxiliary random variables. Thus, we have
Rdet ⊂ {(R0, R1, Rs) : (0, R0, R1, Rs) ∈ R
∗} ⊂ R∗det.
Let
Rd(R0, Rs) = inf{Rd : (Rd, R0, 0, Rs) ∈ R}
be the infimum rate of dummy randomness needed to achieve
the rates (R0, Rs). From Theorem 2, we can characterize not
only the known extreme cases (Corollary 6 and Corollary 7)
but also this quantity.
Corollary 8: Rd(R0, Rs) is the optimal solution of the
following optimization problem:
minimize I(X ;Z|U)
subject to
R0 ≤ min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
R0 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
2See also [6, Theorem 17.13] for the result that does not employ the rate-
equivocation formulation.
3In [5], slightly deferent problem formulation is employed and the achiev-
able region seems slightly different from Corollary 7. But they are essentially
the same.
where (U, V ) satisfy U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z).
Let
Rds = {(Rd, Rs) : (Rd, 0, 0, Rs) ∈ R}.
As a corollary of Theorem 2, we also have the following.
Corollary 9: Let R∗ds be a closed convex set consisting of
those rate pair (Rd, Rs) for which there exist auxiliary random
variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (16)
Rd ≥ I(X ;Z|U). (17)
Then we have Rds = R∗ds.
Remark 10: The auxiliary random variable U in Corollary
9 only plays a role of time-sharing. Thus, the range of U
may be assumed to satisfy |U| ≤ 2. The same remark is also
applied for Corollary 12.
Let
Cs = sup{Rs : ∃Rd ≥ 0 s.t. (Rd, Rs) ∈ Rds}
be the secrecy capacity, which can be characterized by the
supremum of the rate Rs for which there exists auxiliary
random variable V such that V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z) and
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z). (18)
To achieve the rate given by the right hand side of Eq. (18),
we conventionally used the following coding scheme. First,
we construct a wire-tap channel code for channel pairs PY |V
and PZ|V . Then, the code word in Vn is transmitted over
prefixing channel Pn
X|V . If we simulate channel P
n
X|V by using
the channel simulation method [4], then we need randomness
with rate H(X |V )4. By using this argument, we can derive
the following inner bound on Rds that can be achieved
by combining the ordinary wire-tap channel coding and the
channel prefixing by the channel simulation method.
Proposition 11: Let R∗sim be a closed convex set consisting
of those rate pair (Rd, Rs) for which there exist auxiliary
random variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z)
and
Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U), (19)
Rd ≥ I(V ;Z|U) +H(X |V ). (20)
Then we have R∗sim ⊂ Rds.
Since I(X ;Z|U) = I(V ;Z|U) + I(X ;Z|V ) < I(V ;Z|U) +
H(X |V ) in general, the region R∗ds is strictly broader than
the region R∗sim, i.e., the straightforward combination of the
ordinary wire-tap channel coding and the channel prefixing by
the channel simulation is suboptimal.
Corollary 12: Suppose that the channel PY |X is more capa-
ble than PZ|X . Then the region Rds = R∗ds is a closed convex
set consisting of those rate pair (Rd, Rs) for which there exists
an auxiliary random variable U such that U ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z)
and
Rs ≤ I(X ;Y |U)− I(X ;Z|U),
Rd ≥ I(X ;Z|U).
4We are implicitly assuming that the empirical distributions of almost every
code words are close to PV , which is true if we use the random coding
method.
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Fig. 2. The achievable region Rds when PY |X is BSC(0.1) and PZ|X is
BSC(0.2).
Moreover, it may be assumed that the ranges of U may be
assumed to satisfy |U| ≤ 2.
Proof: See Appendix E.
As we can find from Corollary 12, we do not need auxiliary
random variable V when the channel PY |X is more capable
than PZ|X . Thus, two regions R∗ds and R∗sim coincide.
C. Numerical Examples
First, we consider an example such that R∗ds and R∗sim
coincide. Suppose that PY |X and PZ|X are binary symmetric
channels with crossover probabilities ε1 and ε2 respectively,
where ε1 < ε2. In this case, PZ|X is degraded version of
PY |X , which also implies that PY |X is more capable than
PZ|X . Thus, we can apply Corollary 12. Since the auxiliary
random variable U only plays a role of time sharing, region
Rds is the convex hull of the rates (Rd, Rs) satisfying
Rs ≤ [h(p ∗ ε1)− h(ε1)]− [h(p ∗ ε2)− h(ε2)],
Rd ≥ h(p ∗ ε2)− h(ε2)
for some input distribution 0 ≤ PX(0) = p ≤ 1, where h(·) is
the binary entropy function 5 and x ∗ y = x(1− y)+ (1−x)y
is the binary convolution. In Fig. 2, for the case with ε1 = 0.1
and ε2 = 0.2 respectively, the region Rds is plotted. The input
distribution achieving Cs is the uniform distribution, and thus
Rs is constant when Rd ≥ log 2− h(0.2). By using a biased
input distribution, Rs can be positive even if Rd is smaller
than log 2− h(0.2).
Next, we consider an example such that R∗ds and R∗sim do
not coincide. Suppose that PY |X is a binary symmetric channel
with crossover probability ε and PZ|X is a binary erasure
channel with erasure probability δ. When 4ε(1 − ε) log 2 <
δ log 2 < h(ε), it is known that PY |X is not more capable than
PZ|X [22] and Cs > 06. For this example, we can compute
the regions Rds = R∗ds as follows. Since R∗ds is a convex set,
5Note that the base of the logarithm is e.
6Actually, for 4ε(1 − ε) log 2 < δ log 2 < h(ε), PZ|X is more capable
than PY |X but PZ|X is not less noisy than PY |X [22]. Thus, I(X; Y ) ≤
I(X;Z) for every PX but there exists V such that I(V ;Y ) > I(V ;Z),
which means that Cs > 0 and V is needed to achieve Cs.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Rd0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
Rs
Fig. 3. The achievable region Rds = R∗ds (solid line) and suboptimal
inner bound R∗
sim
(dashed line) when PY |X is BSC(0.11) and PZ|X is
BEC(0.45).
for each Rd, we can calculate max{Rs : (Rd, Rs) ∈ R∗ds} by
minimizing
max
PUVX
[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)− µ(I(X ;Z|U)−Rd)] (21)
with respect to µ ≥ 0, where µ is the slope of the supporting
line of R∗ds. Since U only plays the role of the times sharing in
Eq. (21), we can take U to be constant. Furthermore, by using
the support lemma [6], we can assume that |V| ≤ |X | = 2.
Thus, Eq. (21) can be calculated by exhaustive search of three
parameters PV (0), PX|V (0|0), and PX|V (1|1). Since PV (0) =
1
2 is not necessarily optimal
7 for Rd < (1 − δ) log 2, further
reduction of parameters seems difficult. The region R∗sim can
be computed in a similar manner.
In Fig. 3, for the case with ε = 0.11 and δ = 0.45
respectively, the region Rds = R∗ds and R∗sim are plotted.
III. CHANNEL RESOLVABILITY BY SUPERPOSITION
In this section, we consider the channel resolvability prob-
lem. The result in this section will be utilized in the direct
part of the proof of Theorem 2.
In the channel resolvability problem, we want to simulate
the response PnZ by using channel PnZ|X and as small number
of uniform randomness as possible, where PnZ is the nth
product of
PZ(z) =
∑
x
PX(x)PZ|X(z|x)
for input distribution PX . The simulation is conducted by
a deterministic map ϕn : Bn → Xn and uniform random
number Bn on Bn. Let
PZ˜n(z
n) =
∑
bn∈Bn
1
|Bn|
PnZ|X(z
n|ϕn(bn))
be the output distribution with map ϕn. In this paper, the
accuracy of the simulation is evaluated by the divergence
7When there is no constraint on Rd, it is known that PV (0) = 12 and
PX|V (0|0) = PX|V (1|1) are optimal [23].
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criterion D(PZ˜n‖PnZ ). It is well known [12]8 that if
R > I(X ;Z), (22)
then there exists a sequence of maps {ϕn} satisfying
lim
n→∞
D(PZ˜n‖P
n
Z ) = 0, (23)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |Bn| ≤ R. (24)
Typically, a sequence of maps realizing Eqs. (23) and
(24) is constructed by randomly generating |Bn| codeword
xn1 , . . . , x
n
|Bn|
according to PnX . We denote the generated code
Cn. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 13: ([11]) For every n ≥ 1, we have
ECn [D(PZ˜n‖P
n
Z )] ≤
1
θ|Bn|θ
enψ(θ|PZ|X,PX )
for 0 < θ ≤ 1, where ECn [·] means taking the average over the
randomly generated code Cn, and the function ψ(θ|PZ|X , PX)
is defined by
ψ(θ|PZ|X , PX)
= log
∑
z
(∑
x
PX(x)PZ|X(z|x)
1+θ
)
PZ(z)
−θ.(25)
In this paper we construct a sequence of maps realizing
Eq. (23) by a different method. Let PVX be a distribution
such that the marginal is PX . We first randomly generate
|M2,n| codeword vn1 , . . . , vn|M2,n| according to the distribution
PnV . We denote the generated code by C2,n. Then for each
1 ≤ i ≤ |M2,n|, we randomly generate |M1,n| codeword
xni1, . . . , x
n
i|M1,n|
according to the distribution Pn
X|V (·|v
n
i ). We
denote the generated code by C1,n. The empirical distribution
of the codeword is given by
PV˜ nX˜n(v
n, xn) =
∑
i∈M2,n
∑
j∈M1,n
1
|M2,n||M1,n|
1[vni = v
n, xnij = x
n],
PV˜ n(v
n) =
∑
i∈M2,n
1
|M2,n|
1[vni = v
n],
PX˜n|V˜ n(x
n|vn) =
PV˜ nX˜n(v
n, xn)
PV˜ n(v
n)
,
and the output distribution is given by
PZ˜n(z
n) =
∑
vn,xn
PV˜ nX˜n(v
n, xn)PnZ|X(z
n|xn).
For this construction, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 14: For every n ≥ 1, we have
EC1,nC2,n [D(PZ˜n‖P
n
Z )]
≤
1
θ|M1,n|θ
enψ(θ|PZ|X,PX|V ,PV )
+
1
θ′|M2,n|θ
′ e
nψ(θ′|PZ|V ,PV ) (26)
8Actually, slightly weaker statement, i.e., D(P
Z˜n
‖Pn
Z
) in Eq. (23) is
replaced by 1
n
D(P
Z˜n
‖Pn
Z
), was proved in [12]. The present statement can
be derived from the result in [11].
for 0 < θ, θ′ ≤ 1, where EC1,nC2,n [·] means taking the average
over the randomly generated codes C1,n and C2,n, the function
ψ(θ|PZ|X , PX|V , PV ) is defined as
ψ(θ|PZ|X , PX|V , PV )
= log
∑
v
PV (v)
∑
z(∑
x
PX|V (x|v)PZ|X (z|x)
1+θ
)
PZ|V (z|v)
−θ,
(27)
and ψ(θ|·, ·) is defined in Eq. (25).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 15: If R1 > I(X ;Z|V ) and R2 > I(V ;Z),
there exists a sequence of map ϕn : M1,n ×M2,n → Xn
such that
lim
n→∞
D(PZ˜n‖P
n
Z ) = 0, (28)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |M1,n| ≤ R1, (29)
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log |M2,n| ≤ R2. (30)
Proof: See Appendix B.
From Corollary 15, we find that the channel resolvability
coding scheme proposed in this section can achieve the rate
shown in Eq. (22), i.e., I(X ;Z) = I(V ;Z) + I(X ;Z|V ).
Splitting the randomness into two part does not have any
meaning in the channel resolvability coding, but as we will
find in Section IV-A, this coding scheme does have meaning
when we send the confidential message.
IV. PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Proof of Direct Part of Theorem 2
We prove the direct part of Theorem 2 by using the result
in Section III. The direct part of the theorem follows from the
following Lemma 16 and Lemma 17.
Lemma 16: Let R(in) be a closed convex set consisting
of those quadruples (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) for which there exist
auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that U ↔ V ↔ X ↔
(Y, Z) and
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z), (31)
R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U), (32)
R0 +R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y ), (33)
R1 ≥ I(V ;Z|U), (34)
Rd ≥ I(X ;Z|V ). (35)
Then R(in) ⊂ R.
We note the following observation. From the definition of
the problem, if
(Rd − rd, R0 + r0, R1 − r0 − rs + rd, Rs + rs) ∈ R
for some rd, r0, rs ≥ 0, then we also have (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) ∈
R. By using this argument, we have the following.
Lemma 17: We have R∗ ⊂ R.
Proof: See Appendix C.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 6, NO. 1, JANUARY 2007 7
We now prove Lemma 16. For a while, we consider the
case with n = 1 and omit the superscript and subscript to
simplify the notation. For each common message k ∈ K, we
randomly generate codeword uk according to distribution PU .
We denote such a code C0. For each k and for each (ℓ, s) ∈
L × S, we randomly generate codeword vkℓs according to
distribution PV |U (·|uk). We denote such a code C2. For each
(k, ℓ, s) and for each a ∈ A, we randomly generate codeword
xkℓsa according to distribution PX|V (·|vkℓs). We denote such
a code C1.
For real numbers α0, α1, α2 ≥ 0 specified later, let
T0 = {(u, z) : PZ|U (z|u) ≥ e
α0PZ(z)},
T1 = {(u, v, y) : PY |V (y|v) ≥ e
α1PY |U (y|u)},
T2 = {(v, y) : PY |V (y|v) ≥ e
α2PY (y)},
and let T = T1 ∩ (U × T2). Eve’s decoding region is defined
by
Dk = {z : (uk, z) ∈ T0, (ukˆ, z) /∈ T0 ∀kˆ 6= k},
i.e., φ(z) = k if z ∈ Dk9. Bob only decode (k, ℓ, s) and he
does not decode dummy randomness a ∈ A. Bob’s decoding
region is defined by
Dkℓs = {y : (uk, vkℓs, y) ∈ T ,
(u
kˆ
, v
kˆℓˆsˆ
, y) /∈ T ∀(kˆ, ℓˆ, sˆ) 6= (k, ℓ, s)},
i.e., g(y) = (k, ℓ, s) if y ∈ Dkℓs.
By the above code construction, we have the following.
Lemma 18: We have
EC0C1C2 [Perr(f, g)]
≤ PUV Y (T
c
1 ) + PV Y (T
c
2 )
+|L||S|e−α1 + |K||L||S|e−α2 , (36)
EC0C1C2 [Perr(f, φ)]
≤ PUZ (T
c
0 ) + |K|e
−α0 (37)
and
EC0C1C2 [D(f)] ≤
1
θ|A|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X ,PX|V ,PV )
+
1
θ′|L|θ′
eψ(θ
′|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ) (38)
for 0 < θ, θ′ ≤ 1, where the functions ψ(θ|·, ·, ·) is defined by
Eq. (27).
Proof: See Appendix D.
We apply Lemma 18 for asymptotic case. For
(Rd, R0, R1, Rd) ∈ R
(in) and arbitrary small δ > 0,
we set |Kn| = ⌊en(R0−2δ)⌋, |Ln| = ⌊en(R1+2δ)⌋,
|Sn| = ⌊e
n(Rs−4δ)⌋, |An| = ⌊e
n(Rd+2δ)⌋, α0 = I(U ;Z) − δ,
α1 = I(V ;Y |U)− δ, α2 = I(V ;Y )− δ. Then,
|Ln||Sn|e
−α1n ≤ e−n(I(V ;Y |U)−R1−Rs+δ),
|Kn||Ln||Sn|e
−α2n ≤ e−n(I(V ;Y )−R0−R1−Rs+3δ),
|Kn|e
−α0n ≤ e−n(I(U ;Z)−R0+δ)
9If z /∈ Dk for every k ∈ K, we set φ(z) = 1, which is not important in
our analysis of error probability. A similar remark is also applied for Bob’s
decoder.
converge to 0 asymptotically. Furthermore, by the law of
large numbers, PnUV Y (T c1,n), PnV Y (T c2,n), and PnUZ(T c0,n) also
converge to 0 asymptotically.
Since ψ′(0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV ) = I(X ;Z|V ), there exists
θ0 > 0 such that
ψ(θ0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV )
θ0
≤ I(X ;Z|V ) + δ ≤ Rd + δ,
which implies
−
θ0
n
log |An|+ ψ(θ0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV ) ≤ −δ.
Thus,
1
θ0|An|θ0
enψ(θ0|PZ|X ,PX|V ,PV )
exponentially converges to 0 asymptotically. Similarly, since
ψ′(0|PZ|V , PV |U , PU ) = I(V ;Z|U), there exists θ′0 > 0 such
that
ψ(θ′0|PX|V , PV |U , PU )
θ′0
≤ I(V ;Z|U) + δ ≤ R1 + δ,
which implies
−
θ′0
n
log |Ln|+ ψ(θ
′
0|PX|V , PV |U , PU ) ≤ −δ.
Thus,
1
θ′0|Ln|
θ′
0
enψ(θ
′
0
|PX|V ,PV |U ,PU )
exponentially converges 0 asymptotically. This completes the
proof of Lemma 16.
B. Proof of Converse Part of Theorem 2
Suppose that (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) ∈ R. Then, for arbitrary γ >
0, there exists n such that
n(R0 − γ) ≤ log |Kn|,
n(R0 +R1 +Rs − γ) ≤ log |Kn||Ln||Sn|,
n(Rs − γ) ≤ log |Sn|,
n(R1 +Rd + γ) ≥ log |Ln||An|,
n(Rd + γ) ≥ log |An|.
By combining these inequalities with the following Lemma
19 and Lemma 20, we have the converse part of the theorem.
The statement about the range sizes of U and V can be proved
exactly in the same manner as [6, Theorem 17.13]. It should
be noted that Eqs. (9)–(11) are derived in the same manner
as [6, Theorem 17.13] and the construction of the auxiliary
random variables are also the same. Eqs. (12) and (13) are
additionally proved in this paper by using the fact that the
encoder is deterministic given the dummy randomness.
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Lemma 19: There exists εn → 0 such that
log |Kn|
≤ I(Kn;Y
n) + nεn,
log |Kn|
≤ I(Kn;Z
n) + nεn,
log |Kn||Ln||Sn|
≤ I(Kn, Ln, Sn;Y
n) + nεn,
log |Kn||Ln||Sn|
≤ I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn) + I(Kn;Z
n) + 2nεn,
log |Sn|
≤ I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Ln, Sn;Z
n|Kn) + 4nεn,
log |Ln||An|
≥ I(Xn;Zn|Kn)− 2nεn,
log |An|
≥ I(Xn;Zn|Kn, Ln, Sn).
Proof: By using Fano’s inequality, we have
log |Kn| = H(Kn)
= I(Kn;Y
n) +H(Kn|Y
n)
≤ I(Kn;Y
n) + nεn,
and
log |Kn| ≤ I(Kn;Z
n) + nεn.
By using Fano’s inequality, we also have
log |Kn||Ln||Sn| = H(Kn, Ln, Sn)
≤ I(Kn, Ln, Sn;Y
n) + nεn
and
log |Kn||Ln||Sn|
= H(Ln, Sn|Kn) +H(Kn)
= I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn) + I(Kn;Z
n) + 2nεn.
By using the security condition and Fano’s inequality, we have
I(Sn;Z
n|Kn)
= I(Sn,Kn;Z
n)− I(Kn;Z
n)
= I(Sn;Z
n) + I(Kn;Z
n|Sn)− I(Kn;Z
n)
≤ I(Sn;Z
n) +H(Kn|Z
n)
≤ 2nεn. (39)
By using Fano’s inequality and by using Eq. (39), we have
log |Sn|
= H(Sn|Kn)
≤ I(Sn;Y
n|Kn) + nεn
= I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Ln;Y
n|Sn,Kn) + nεn
≤ I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)−H(Ln|Sn,Kn) + 2nεn
≤ I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Sn;Z
n|Kn)
−H(Ln|Sn,Kn) + 4nεn
≤ I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Ln, Sn;Z
n|Kn) + 4nεn.
By noting that fn is a deterministic function and by using
Eq. (39), we have
log |Ln||An|
≥ H(Xn|Kn, Sn)
≥ I(Xn;Zn|Kn, Sn)
= I(Xn, Sn;Z
n|Kn)− I(Sn;Z
n|Kn)
≥ I(Xn;Zn|Kn)− 2nεn.
Finally, by noting that fn is a deterministic function, we have
log |An| ≥ H(X
n|Kn, Ln, Sn)
≥ I(Xn;Zn|Kn, Ln, Sn).
Lemma 20: For fixed n, let T be the random variable that is
uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n} and independent of the
other random variables. Define the following auxiliary random
variables
Ut = (Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1),
Vt = (Ln, Sn, Ut),
U = (UT , T ),
V = (VT , T ).
Then, we have
I(Kn;Y
n)
≤ nI(U ;Y ), (40)
I(Kn;Z
n)
≤ nI(U ;Z), (41)
I(Kn, Ln, Sn;Y
n)
≤ n[I(V ;Y |U) + I(U ;Y )], (42)
I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn) + I(Kn;Z
n)
≤ n[I(V ;Y |U) + I(U ;Z)], (43)
I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Ln, Sn;Z
n|Kn)
≤ n[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)], (44)
I(Xn;Zn|Kn)
≥ nI(X ;Z|U), (45)
I(Xn;Zn|Kn, Ln, Sn)
≥ nI(X ;Z|V ) (46)
and
U ↔ V ↔ X ↔ (Y, Z). (47)
Proof: Since the proof of Eq. (47) is well known [6], we
only prove the other inequalities.
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a) Proof of Eq. (40):
I(Kn;Y
n)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Kn;Yt|Y
t−1
1 )
≤
n∑
t=1
I(Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1;Yt)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Yt)
= nI(UT ;YT |T )
= nI(UT , T ;YT )
= nI(U ;Y ).
b) Proof of Eq. (41):
I(Kn;Z
n)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Kn;Zt|Z
n
t+1)
≤
n∑
t=1
I(Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1;Zt)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Zt)
= nI(UT ;ZT |T )
= nI(UT , T ;ZT )
= nI(U ;Z).
c) Proof of Eq. (42):
I(Kn, Ln, Sn;Y
n)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Kn, Ln, Sn;Yt|Y
t−1
1 )
≤
n∑
t=1
I(Kn, Ln, Sn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1;Yt)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Ut, Vt;Yt)
= nI(UT , VT ;YT |T )
= nI(U, V ;Y )
= n[I(V ;Y |U) + I(U ;Y )].
d) Proof of Eq. (43):
I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn) + I(Kn;Z
n)
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 ) + I(Kn;Zt|Z
n
t+1)]
≤
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
+I(Znt+1;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 ) + I(Kn;ZT |Z
n
t+1)]
(a)
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
t , Z
n
t+1)
+I(Y t−11 ;Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1) + I(Kn;Zt|Z
n
t+1)]
≤
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
+I(Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1;Zt)]
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Vt;Yt|Ut) + I(Ut;Zt)]
= n[I(VT ;YT |UT , T ) + I(UT ;ZT |T )]
= n[I(V ;Y |U) + I(U ;Z)],
where we used Csisza´r’s sum identity [24] in (a).
e) Proof of Eq. (44):
I(Ln, Sn;Y
n|Kn)− I(Ln, Sn;Z
n|Kn)
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 )− I(Ln, Sn;Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1)]
(a)
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
t )
+I(Znt+1;Yt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Y
t−1
1 )
−I(Y t−11 ;Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Z
n
t+1)
−I(Ln, Sn;Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn, Z
n
t+1;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 )
−I(Ln, Sn, Y
t−1
1 ;Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1)]
(b)
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
+I(Znt+1;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 )− I(Y
t−1
1 ;Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1)
−I(Ln, Sn;Zt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Ln, Sn;Yt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
−I(Ln, Sn;Zt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
[I(Vt;Yt|Ut)− I(Vt;Zt|Ut)]
= n[I(VT ;YT |UT , T )− I(VT ;ZT |UT , T )]
= n[I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)],
where (a) and (b) follow from Csisza´r’s sum identity [24].
f) Proof of Eq. (45):
I(Xn;Zn|Kn)
=
n∑
t=1
[H(Zt|Kn, Z
n
t+1)−H(Zt|Kn, X
n, Znt+1)]
(a)
≥
n∑
t=1
[H(Zt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)−H(Zt|Kn, Xt, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Zt|Kn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Zt|Ut)
= nI(XT ;ZT |UT , T )
= nI(X ;Z|U),
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where (a) follows from the fact that
(Kn, X
t−1
1 , X
n
t+1, Y
t−1
1 , Zt+1), Xt, and Zt form Markov
chain.
g) Proof of Eq. (46):
I(Xn;Zn|Kn, Ln, Sn)
=
n∑
t=1
[H(Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Z
n
t+1)
−H(Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, X
n, Znt+1)]
(a)
≥
n∑
t=1
[H(Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
−H(Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Xt, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)]
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Zt|Kn, Ln, Sn, Y
t−1
1 , Z
n
t+1)
=
n∑
t=1
I(Xt;Zt|Vt)
= nI(XT ;ZT |VT , T )
= nI(X ;Z|V ),
where (a) follows from the fact that (Kn, Ln, Sn, Xt−11 , Xnt+1,
Y t−11 , Z
n
t+1), Xt, and Zt form Markov chain.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the trade-off between the rate
of the random number, the rates of common, private, and
confidential messages.
As a by-product of our result, Lemma 14 can be also applied
to the three receiver wire-tap channel, and the lower bound
of secrecy capacity obtained in [7, Corollary 1] with strong
security can be proved.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 14
For simplicity of notation, we only prove the statement for
n = 1, and the subscript n is omitted in the proof. The
statement for n ≥ 2 can be proved by regarding the nth
product distribution as one distribution and by noting that
ψ(θ|PnZ|X , P
n
X|V , P
n
V ) = nψ(θ|PZ|X , PX|V , PV )
and
ψ(θ′|PnZ|V , P
n
V ) = nψ(θ
′|PZ|V , PV )
hold.
We first note the following observations. By taking average
over the randomly generated codes C1 and C2, we have
EC1C2
[
PV˜ (v)PX˜|V˜ (x|v)
]
= EC1C2

 ∑
i∈M2
∑
j∈M1
1
|M1||M2|
1[vi = v, xij = x]


= PV X(v, x)
and
EC1C2 [PV˜ (v)] = EC2 [PV˜ (v)]
= EC2
[ ∑
i∈M2
1
|M2|
1[vi = v]
]
= PV (v). (48)
Furthermore, for fixed C2, by taking the average over the
randomly generated code C1, we have
EC1
[
PX˜|V˜ (x|v)
]
= EC1
[∑
i∈M2
∑
j∈M1
1
|M1||M2|
1[vi = v, xij = x]
PV˜ (v)
]
=
∑
i∈M2
∑
j∈M1
1
|M1||M2|
1[vi = v]PX|V (x|v)
PV˜ (v)
= PX|V (x|v) (49)
Let PZ′ be the output distribution when the input distribu-
tion is PV˜ (v)PX|V (x|v). Then, from Eq. (49), we have
EC1 [PZ˜(z)] = PZ′(z)
for every z ∈ Z . Thus, we have
EC1C2 [D(PZ˜‖PZ)]
= EC1C2
[∑
z
PZ˜(z) log
PZ˜(z)
PZ(z)
]
= EC2
[
EC1
[∑
z
PZ˜(z) log
PZ˜(z)
PZ′ (z)
]
+ EC1
[∑
z
PZ˜(z) log
PZ′(z)
PZ(z)
]]
= EC1C2
[∑
z
PZ˜(z) log
PZ˜(z)
PZ′(z)
]
+ EC2
[∑
z
PZ′ (z) log
PZ′ (z)
PZ(z)
]
= EC1C2 [D(PZ˜‖PZ′)] + EC2 [D(PZ′‖PZ)] . (50)
We bound each term of Eq. (50) by using Proposition 13.
By the monotonicity of the divergence, we have
D(PZ˜‖PZ′) ≤ D(PIZ˜‖PIZ′)
=
∑
i∈M2
1
|M2|
D(PZ˜|I(·|i)‖PZ|V (·|vi)),
where
PIZ˜(i, z) =
1
|M2|
∑
j∈M1
1
|M1|
PZ|X(z|xij)
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and
PIZ′(i, z) =
1
|M2|
PZ|V (z|vi).
Thus, by taking average over C1 and by using Proposition 13
for input distribution PX|V (·|vi) instead of PX , we have
EC1 [D(PZ˜‖PZ′)]
≤
∑
i∈M2
1
|M2|
EC1
[
D(PZ˜|I(·|i)‖PZ|V (·|vi))
]
≤
∑
i∈M2
1
|M2|
1
θ|M1|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X ,PX|V (·|vi)).
By taking average over C2 and by noting Eq. (48), we have
EC1C2 [D(PZ˜‖PZ′)]
≤
∑
v
PV (v)
1
θ|M1|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X,PX|V (·|v))
=
1
θ|M1|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X ,PX|V ,PV ).
On the other hand, by using Proposition 13 for input
distribution PV and channel PZ|V , we have
EC2 [D(PZ′‖PZ)] ≤
1
θ′|M2|θ
′ e
ψ(θ′|PZ|V ,PV ).
B. Proof of Corollary 15
We can choose γ > 0 such that R1 ≥ I(X ;Z|V ) + 2γ and
R2 ≥ I(V ;Z)+2γ. Let |M1,n| = ⌊enR1⌋, |M2,n| = ⌊enR2⌋.
Since ψ′(0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV ) = I(X ;Z|V ), there exists θ0 >
0 such that
ψ(θ0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV )
θ0
≤ I(X ;Z|V ) + γ ≤ R1 − γ,
which implies
−
θ0
n
log |M1,n|+ ψ(θ0|PZ|X , PX|V , PV ) ≤ −γ < 0.
Thus, the first term of Eq. (26) converges to 0 asymptotically.
Similarly, we can show that the second term of Eq. (26)
converges to 0 asymptotically. Thus, we have the assertion
of the corollary.
C. Proof of Lemma 17
Although the lemma can be systematically proved by using
the Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we explicitly find (rd, r0, rs)
satisfying
(Rd − rd, R0 + r0, R1 − r0 − rs + rd, Rs + rs) ∈ R
(in) (51)
for given (Rd, R0, R1, Rs) ∈ R∗ as follows.
If R1 +Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) and R1 < I(V ;Z|U), we set
rd := I(V ;Z|U)−R1
and (r0, rs) := (0, 0). Then, Eqs. (31), and (34) are obviously
satisfied. Eq. (32) can be confirmed as
R1 + rd +Rs ≤ I(V ;Z|U) + I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
= I(V ;Y |U),
Eq (33) can be confirmed as
R0 +R1 + rd +Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;Y |U)
= I(V ;Y ),
and Eq. (35) can be confirmed as
Rd − rd = Rd +R1 − I(V ;Z|U)
≥ I(X ;Z|U)− I(V ;Z|U)
= I(X ;Z|V ).
Thus, Eq. (51) holds.
If R1 + Rs ≤ I(V ;Y |U) and R1 ≥ I(V ;Z|U), we set
(rd, r1, rs) := (0, 0, 0). Then, Eq. (51) obviously holds.
If R1 +Rs > I(V ;Y |U), we set rd := 0 and
rs := I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)−Rs,
r0 := R1 +Rs − I(V ;Y |U)
= (R1 − rs) + (Rs + rs)− I(V ;Y |U)
= R1 − rs − I(V ;Z|U). (52)
Then, Eqs. (32), (33), and (35) are obviously satisfied. Eq. (31)
can be confirmed as
R0 + r0 = R0 +R1 +Rs − I(V ;Y |U)
≤ I(U ;Z),
and Eq. (34) can be confirmed from Eq. (52). Thus, Eq. (51)
is satisfied.
D. Proof of Lemma 18
a) Proof of Eq. (36): We first note the following obser-
vations. By taking the average over randomly generated codes,
we have
EC0C1C2 [Perr(f, g)]
= EC0C1C2

 ∑
k,ℓ,s,a
1
|K||L||S||A|
PY |X(D
c
kℓs|xkℓsa)


= EC0C2

 ∑
k,ℓ,s,a
1
|K||L||S||A|
EC1
[
PY |X(D
c
kℓs|xkℓsa)
]
= EC0C2

∑
k,ℓ,s
1
|K||L||S|
PY |V (D
c
kℓs|vkℓs)

 . (53)
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Let Tuv = {y : (u, v, y) ∈ T }. Then, we have
EC0C2

∑
k,ℓ,s
1
|K||L||S|
PY |V (D
c
kℓs|vkℓs)


≤ EC0C1

∑
k,ℓ,s
1
|K||L||S|
{PY |V (T
c
ukvkℓs
|vkℓs)
+
∑
(kˆ,ℓˆ,sˆ) 6=(k,ℓ,s)
PY |V (Tukˆvkˆℓˆsˆ |vkℓs)}


= EC0C2

∑
k,ℓ,s
1
|K||L||S|
{
PY |V (T
c
ukvkℓs
|vkℓs)
+
∑
(ℓˆ,sˆ) 6=(ℓ,s)
PY |V (Tukvkℓˆsˆ |vkℓs)
+
∑
k 6=kˆ
∑
ℓˆ,sˆ
PY |V (Tukˆvkˆℓˆsˆ |vkℓs)}


≤
∑
k,ℓ,s
1
|K||L||S|
{PUV Y (T
c)
+|L||S|
∑
u,v
PUV (u, v)PY |U (Tuv|u)
+|K||L||S|
∑
u,v
PUV (u, v)PY (Tuv)}
≤ PUV Y (T
c) + |L||S|e−α1 + |K||L||S|e−α2 ,
where we used
PY |U (y|u) ≤ PY |V (y|v)e
−α1 ,
PY (y) ≤ PY |V (y|v)e
−α2
for y ∈ Tuv in the last inequality.
b) Proof of Eq. (37): In a similar manner as Eq. (53),
we have
EC0C1C2 [Perr(f, φ)] = EC0
[∑
k
1
|K|
PZ|U (D
c
k|uk)
]
,
which is just a random coding error probability of channel
PZ|U . Thus, by the standard arguments of the information
spectrum approach [25], we have Eq. (37).
c) Proof of Eq. (38): By the monotonicity of the diver-
gence, we have
D(PSZ˜‖PS × PZ˜)
≤ D(PKSZ˜‖PS × PKZ˜)
=
∑
k
1
|K|
D(PSZ˜|K(·|k)‖PS × PZ˜|K(·|k))
=
∑
k,s
1
|K||S|
D(PZ˜|KS(·|k, s)‖PZ˜|K(·|k)).
Note that the relation∑
s
1
|S|
D(PZ˜|KS(·|k, s)‖PZ˜|K(·|k))
+D(PZ˜|K(·|k)‖PZ|U (·|uk))
=
∑
s
1
|S|
D(PZ˜|KS(·|k, s)‖PZ|U (·|uk))
holds for each k ∈ K. Thus, by using Lemma 14 for
PV |U (·|uk) instead of PV , we have
EC1C2 [D(f)]
≤
∑
k
1
|K|
[
1
θ|A|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X ,PX|V ,PV |U (·|uk))
+
1
θ′|L|θ′
eψ(θ
′|PZ|V ,PV |U (·|uk))
]
.
By taking average over C0 and by noting
EC0
[∑
k
1
|K|
1[uk = u]
]
= PU (u),
we have
EC0C1C2 [D(f)]
≤
∑
u
PU (u)
[
1
θ|A|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X,PX|V ,PV |U (·|u))
+
1
θ′|L|θ′
eψ(θ
′|PZ|V ,PV |U (·|u))
]
=
1
θ|A|θ
eψ(θ|PZ|X ,PX|V ,PV )
+
1
θ′|L|θ′
eψ(θ
′|PZ|V ,PV |U ,PU ).
E. Proof of Corollary 12
By noting that U , V , X , and (Y, Z) form Markov chain,
which implies I(V ;Y |X,U) = 0 and I(V ;Z|X,U) = 0, we
have
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
= I(V,X ;Y |U)− I(V,X ;Z|U)
−[I(X ;Y |U, V )− I(X ;Z|U, V )]
= I(X ;Y |U)− I(X ;Z|U)
−[I(X ;Y |U, V )− I(X ;Z|U, V )].
Since PY |X is more capable than PZ|X , we have
I(X ;Y |U = u, V = v)− I(X ;Z|U = u, V = v) ≥ 0
for every (u, v), which implies
I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) ≤ I(X ;Y |U)− I(X ;Z|U).
Thus, the auxiliary random variable V is not needed.
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